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Abstract: In today’s world, Web applications play a very 
important role in individual life as well as in any country’s 
development. Web applications have gone through a very rapid 
growth in the recent years and their adoption is moving faster than 
that was expected few years ago. Now-a-days, billions of 
transactions are done online with the aid of different Web 
applications. Though these applications are used by hundreds of 
people, in many cases the security level is weak, which makes them 
vulnerable to get compromised. In most of the scenarios, a user has 
to be identified before any communication is established with the 
backend database. An arbitrary user should not be allowed access to 
the system without proof of valid credentials. However, a crafted 
injection gives access to unauthorized users. This is mostly 
accomplished via SQL Injection input. In spite of the development 
of different approaches to prevent SQL injection, it still remains an 
alarming threat to Web applications. In this paper, we present a 
detailed survey on various types of SQL Injection vulnerabilities, 
attacks, and their prevention techniques. Alongside presenting our 
findings from the study, we also note down future expectations and 
possible development of countermeasures against SQL Injection 
attacks.  
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1.  Introduction 
In the recent years, the World Wide Web (WWW) has 
witnessed a staggering growth of many online Web 
applications which have been developed for meeting various 
purposes. Now-a-days, almost everyone in touch with 
‘computer technology’ is somehow connected online. To 
serve this huge number of users, great volumes of data are 
stored in Web application databases in different parts of the 
globe. From time to time, the users need to interact with the 
backend databases via the user interfaces for various tasks 
such as: updating data, making queries, extracting data, and 
so forth. For all these operations, design interface plays a 
crucial role, the quality of which has a great impact on the 
security of the stored data in the database. A less secure Web 
application design may allow crafted injection and malicious 
update on the backend database. This trend can cause lots of 
damages and thefts of trusted users’ sensitive data by 
unauthorized users. In the worst case, the attacker may gain 
full control over the Web application and totally destroy or 
damage the system.  This is successfully achieved, in general, 
via SQL injection attacks on the online Web application 
database. In this paper, we have reviewed most of the well-
known and new SQL Injection attacks, vulnerabilities and 
prevention techniques. We present this topic in a way that the 
work could be beneficial both for the general readers and for 
the researchers in the area for their future research works.  
SQL Injection is a type of injection or attack in a Web 
application, in which the attacker provides Structured Query 
Language (SQL) code to a user input box of a Web form to 
gain unauthorized and unlimited access. The attacker’s input 
is transmitted into an SQL query in such a way that it forms 
an SQL code [1], [10]. In fact, SQL Injection is categorized 
as the top-10 2010 Web application vulnerabilities 
experienced by Web applications according to OWASP 
(Open Web Application Security Project) [9]. 
SQL Injection Vulnerabilities (SQLIVs) are one of the 
open doors for hackers to explore.  Hence, they constitute a 
severe threat for Web application contents. The key root and 
basis of SQLIVs is quite simple and well understood: 
insufficient validation of user input [1]. To mitigate these 
vulnerabilities, many prevention techniques have been 
suggested such as manual approach, automated approach; 
secure coding practices, static analysis, using prepared 
statements, and so forth. Though, proposed approaches have 
achieved their goals to some extent, SQL Injection 
Vulnerabilities in Web applications remain as a major 
concern among application developers. 
Relating to the above mentioned texts, the key objective of 
this work is to present a detailed survey on various types of 
SQL Injection vulnerabilities, attacks, and their prevention 
techniques. Alongside presenting our findings from the study, 
we also note down future expectations and possible 
development of countermeasures against SQL Injection 
attacks. The key purpose of this study is to address the issue 
from all necessary angles so that the work could be used as a 
reference work by the researchers and practitioners. Till 
today, a comprehensive survey on this topic is missing; 
hence, we believe our work could fill the void. 
Though there are some previous works on SQL Injections, 
they have mainly the following limitations: 
- Not up-to-date: the growth of e-commerce is almost 
parallel to the alarming threats targeting Web applications 
using SQL Injections. Hence, the relevance and accuracy of 
some previous publications are now questionable. The more 
the time passes by, the more kinds of attacks evolve and put 
less confidence on the previously noted information. 
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Figure 1. Normal user input process in a Web application. 
 
- Lack of practice: In almost all the previous works, there 
is a critical lack of a discussion about the Web application 
security training tutorials used in practice. Sometimes, there 
is huge gap between theory and practice. Hence, in our work 
we mention the tools that should be known for practical use 
and tackling SQL injection attacks. The information about 
these tools is missing in most, if not all of the previous works 
we have analyzed. 
After this initial information, the rest of the paper is 
organized as follows: in Section 2, we provide SQL Injection 
background and categorize the vulnerabilities and attacks. 
Section 3 presents an in-depth look at the most common SQL 
Injection attacks. Section 4 notes down the tools and tutorials 
that we have used for our work, Section 5 talks about various 
approaches for detecting SQL Injection attacks, Section 6 
notes down the available countermeasures to tackle various 
SQL Injection attacks and a comparative analysis of various 
attacks and schemes, and finally, Section 7 concludes the 
paper noting the contribution of this work alongside 
mentioning our future research objectives.  
2.  SQL Injection: The ‘Need-to-Know’ Aspects 
2.1 What is SQL? 
SQL (pronounced as “S-Q-L” or "sequel") stands for 
Structured Query Language. It is the high level language used 
in various relational Database Management Systems 
(DBMS). SQL was originally developed in the early 1970’s 
by Edgar F. Codd at IBM. It was commercial and the most-
widely used language for all relational databases. This 
language is a declarative computer language which has 
elements that include clauses, expressions, predicates, 
queries, and statements. It allows the users mainly, (i) data 
insertion, (ii) data updating, (iii) query, (iv) deletion, and 
many more features (thus gives the user the power of 
manipulating databases) [6], [7]. 
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Figure 2. Malicious input process in a Web application. 
 
2.2 SQL Injection Vulnerability versus SQL Injection 
Attack 
Vulnerability in any system is defined as a bug, loophole, 
weakness or flaw existing in the system that can be exploited 
by an unauthorized user in order to gain unlimited access to 
the stored data. Attack generally means an illegal access, 
gained through well crafted mechanisms, to an application or 
system. An SQL Injection Attack (SQLIA) is a type of attack 
[30] whereby an attacker (a crafted user) adds malicious 
keywords or operators into an SQL query (e.g., SQL 
malicious code statements), then injects it to a user input box 
of a Web application. This allows the attacker to have illegal 
and unrestricted access to the data stored at the backend 
database. Figure 1 shows the normal user input process in a 
Web application, which is self-explanatory. Figure 2 shows 
an example how a malicious input could be processed in a 
Web application. In this case, the malicious input is the 
carefully formulated SQL query which passes through the 
system’s verification method. To explore this area more, in 
this paper, we investigate both the SQL Injection 
vulnerabilities and SQL Injection attacks. 
2.3 Why is SQL Injection a Threat? 
Injecting a Web application is the synonym of having illegal 
access to the data stored in the database. The data sometimes 
could be confidential and of high value like the financial 
secrets of a bank or list of financial transactions or secret 
information of some kind of information system. An 
unauthorized access to this data by a crafted user can pose 
threat to their confidentiality, integrity, and authority. As a 
result, the system could bear heavy loss in giving proper 
services to its users or it may even face complete destruction. 
Sometimes such type of collapse of a system can threaten the 
existence of a company or a bank or an industry. If it happens 
against the information system of a hospital, the private 
information of the patients may be leaked out which could 
threaten their reputation or may become a case of 
defamation. Attackers may even use such type of attack to get 
confidential information that is related to the national 
security of a country. Hence, SQL Injection could be very 
dangerous in many cases depending on the platform where 
the attack is launched and where it gets success in injecting 
rogue users to the target system. 
2.4 Types of Vulnerabilities in Web Programming 
Languages 
There could be various types of vulnerabilities that could be 
exploited for SQL Injection. In this section, we present the 
most common security vulnerabilities found in Web 
programming languages [12] through which SQL Injection 
attacks are usually launched. We show the major types of 
vulnerabilities at a glance in Table 1. 
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Table 1. Types of Vulnerabilities at a glance 
Vulnerability 
Types Basic Idea 
Type I 
Lack of clear distinction between data types 
accepted as input in the programming language 
used for the Web application development.  
Type II 
Delay of operation analysis till the runtime 
phase where the current variables are considered 
rather than the source code expressions.  
Type III 
Weak concern of type specification in the 
design: a number can be used as a string or vice-
versa.  
Type IV 
The validation of the user input is not well 
defined or sanitized. Inputs are not checked 
correctly.  
 
2.5 Types of SQL Injection Attacks (SQLIAs): Past and 
Present  
It is not an easy task to find out and categorize all types of 
SQLIAs. The same attack may be called with different names 
in different cases depending on the system scenario. In this 
sub-section, we present all the commonly known SQL 
Injection attacks [1], [11] that so far have been discovered 
along with newly invented innovative attacks. We use the 
terminologies as deem to be appropriate. Table 2 shows the 
types of SQL Injection attacks with brief descriptions. 
3.  An In-Depth Look At the Most common 
SQL Injection Attacks  
Among various types of SQLI attacks, some are frequently 
used by the attackers. It is imperative to know the commonly 
used major attacks among all available attacks. Hence, in this 
section, we present an in-depth look at some of the most 
common SQL Injection attacks. We explain each of these 
major attacks with simple examples, wherever appropriate. 
3.1 Tautology 
SQL injection codes are injected into one or more 
conditional statements so that they are always evaluated to be 
true. Under this technique, we may have the following types 
and scenarios of attacks: 
3.1.1 String SQL Injection 
This type of injection is also referred to as AND/OR Attack 
[14], [15]. The attacker inputs SQL tokens or strings to a 
conditional query statement that always evaluates to a true 
statement. The interesting issue with this type of attack is that 
instead of returning only one row in a table, if it is successful, 
it causes all of the rows in the database table targeted by the 
query to be returned. The goal behind this type of attack may 
include the following: (a) Bypassing authentication, (b) 
Identifying parameters that can be injected, and (c) 
Extraction of data [1]. 
 
  Scenario  
• Normal Statement: SELECT * FROM users 
WHERE name='Lucia01 
Input: Lucia01  Output: Lucia's Rows 
only   
• Injected Statement: SELECT * FROM 
users WHERE name= 'Lucia01’ OR '1' 
='1'  
 Input: 'Lucia01' OR '1' ='1' 
Output: this will return rows for 
Lucia01 OR wherever one equals to one 
which is true for all rows. Hence, all 
rows will be returned. 
 
3.1.2 Numeric SQL Injection 
This type of Injection is quasi-similar to the above discussed. 
The main difference is that; here numeric values are used 
instead of strings. Therefore, the attacker would input 
numeric values to a conditional query statement that would 
always evaluate to a true statement.  
 
  Scenario  
• Normal Statement: SELECT * FROM users 
WHERE id= '101'  
Input: 101 Output: id 101's Rows only.  
• Injected Statement: SELECT * FROM 
users WHERE name= '101' OR '1' ='1'.  
Input: '101' OR '1' ='1' 
Output: this will return rows for 
'101'id or wherever one equals to one 
(ALL ROWS)  
Note: the crafted user can be more 
specific by adding ORDER BY clause to 
get exactly what he wants on time. The 
malicious input will look like: 101 OR 
1=1 ORDER BY salary desc;  
 
3.1.3 Comments Attack 
This type of attack takes advantage of the inline commenting 
allowed by SQL [29] - the malicious code and comments 
whatever comes after the “--” in the WHERE clause. The 
point is that everything after the comment characters will be 
ignored. Comments Attack can be combined with either 
String or Numeric SQL Injection so that it performs as a 
tautology which always evaluates to a true statement.  
 
  Scenario  
• User Input: ‘user1 OR ‘1’ =’1 —‘.       
• Generated SQL Query: SELECT username, 
password FROM clients WHERE username = 
‘user1 OR ‘1’ =’1 —‘ AND password = 
‘whatever’. 
 
In this case, not only the WHERE clause is transformed 
into a tautology by the (OR 1=1) but also the password part 
is also completely ignored, hence only the username part will 
be checked [1], [29]. 
 
 3.2 Inference 
An attacker derives logical conclusions from the answer to 
a true/false question concerning the database. Through a 
successful inference, crafted users change the behavior of the 
database. 
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Table 2. Types of SQLIAs at a glance. 
Types of Attack Working Method 
Tautologies SQL injection codes are injected into one or more conditional statements so that they are always evaluated to be true. 
Logically Incorrect 
Queries 
Using error messages rejected by the database to find useful data facilitating 
injection of the backend database. 
Union Query Injected query is joined with a safe query using the keyword UNION in order to get information related to other tables from the application. 
Stored Procedure Many databases have built-in stored procedures. The attacker executes these built-in functions using malicious SQL Injection codes. 
Piggy-Backed Queries Additional malicious queries are inserted into an original injected query. 
Inference 
- Blind 
Injection  
- Timing 
Attacks 
An attacker derives logical conclusions from the answer to a true/false question 
concerning the database. 
- Information is collected by inferring from the replies of the page after 
questioning the server true/false questions. 
- An attacker collects information by observing the response time 
(behavior) of the database. 
Alternate Encodings It aims to avoid being identified by secure defensive coding and automated prevention mechanisms. It is usually combined with other attack techniques. 
 
 
3.2.1 Blind SQL Injection 
In this type of attack, useful information for exploiting the 
backend database is collected by inferring from the replies of 
the page after questioning the server some true/false 
questions. It is very similar to a normal SQL Injection [14], 
[15]. However, when an attacker attempts to exploit an 
application, rather than getting a useful error message, they 
get a generic page specified by the developer instead. This 
makes exploiting a potential SQL Injection attack more 
difficult but not impossible. An attacker can still get access to 
sensitive data by asking a series of True and False questions 
through SQL statements.  
 
 
  Scenario  
http://victim/listproducts.asp?cat=boo
ks  
SELECT * from PRODUCTS WHERE 
category='books' 
http://victim/listproducts.asp?cat=boo
ks' or '1'='1.  
SELECT * from PRODUCTS WHERE 
category='books' or '1'='1'.   
 
3.2.2 Timing Attacks  
An attacker collects information by observing the response 
time (behavior) of the database. Here the main concern is to 
observe the response time that will help the attacker to decide 
wisely on the appropriate injection approach.  
 
3.2.3 Database Backdoors 
Databases are used not only for data storage but also to keep 
malicious activity like a trigger. In this case, an attacker can 
set a trigger in order to get the user input and get it directed 
to his or her e-mail, for example.  
 
  Scenario 
101; CREATE TRIGGER myBackDoor BEFORE 
INSERT ON employee FOR EACH ROW BEGIN 
UPDATE employee SET 
email='hacker@me.com'WHERE userid = 
NEW.userid. 
 
3.2.4 Command SQL Injection 
The purpose of this injection is to inject and execute 
commands specified by the hacker in the vulnerable 
application. The application executing the unwanted system 
commands is like a pseudo system-shell controlled by the 
attacker. Lack of correct input data validation (forms, 
cookies, HTTP headers, etc.) is the main vulnerability 
exploited by attackers for a successful injection. It differs 
from code injection in the sense that the attacker adds his 
own code to the existing code. Hence, the default 
functionalities of the application are extended without 
executing system commands. An OS (Operating System) 
command injection attack occurs when an attacker attempts 
to execute system level commands through a vulnerable 
application. Applications are considered vulnerable to OS 
command injection attack if they utilize user input in a 
system level command. 
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Figure 3. OWASP environment/interface. 
 
 
 
Figure 4. DVWA environment. 
 
4. Web Application Security Training Tutorials 
Used 
In this section, we discuss some existing Web Application 
security tutorials that we have used either online or offline 
for analysing various mechanisms. These tutorials 
purposefully contain vulnerabilities for the user to discover 
and exploit. 
OWASP - The Open Web Application Security Project 
(OWASP) is a 501c3 not-for-profit worldwide charitable 
organization focused on improving the security of application 
software [25]. Tutorials are written in Java. This tutorial 
covers the 10 most common Web application vulnerabilities 
such as (i) Injection flaws, (ii) Cross-Site Scripting (XSS), 
(iii) Broken Authentication and Session Management, (iv) 
Insecure Direct Object References, (v) Cross-Site Request 
Forgery (CSRF), (vi) Security Misconfiguration, (vii) 
Insecure Cryptographic Storage, (viii) Failure to Restrict 
URL Access, (ix) Insufficient Transport Layer Protection, 
and (x) Invalidated Redirects and Forwards. In addition, they 
provide hints, prevention, solution, and show java options. 
Every year they present the Top-10 Web Application 
vulnerabilities. The source code of the project and LiveCD 
are free of charge and accessible to almost every user. 
Though it provides comprehensive practices, the explanation 
of the topics is lacking and is left to the user to learn. It 
focuses more on hands-on part rather than the teaching side. 
Because of being completely Java-oriented, it is not 
concerned about applications built using other languages 
such as PHP or RoR (Ruby on Rails). Figure 3 shows an 
OWASP environment. 
DVWA - Damn Vulnerable Web Application (DVWA) 
[26] is another practice tool built using PHP/MySQL. It is an 
aid for security professionals and Web developers to test and 
try out their skills and tools in a legal practice environment. 
Besides that, it is a handy approach to train/teach users (i.e., 
students, teachers, researchers, security professionals) on 
Secure Web Development. The source code and LiveCD are 
made available for free. This tutorial covers the following 
topics: Brute Force, Command Execution, CSRF, File 
Inclusion, SQL Injection (Blind), Upload, XSS reflected, and 
XSS stored.  Compared to OWASP, it is less comprehensive 
and covers only few topics. In this tutorial, there is a lack of 
adequate information not only of direct topic-related 
discussions but also of guidelines, hints, and solutions. Users 
can only find information on topics through some provided 
Internet links/sources. Figure 4 shows the DVWA 
environment. 
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Figure 5. Web Security Dojo environment. 
 
 
Figure 6. daffodil lessons. 
 
Web Security Dojo - This is a “free open-source self-
contained training environment for Web Application Security 
penetration testing. Tools + Targets = Dojo” [27]. The 
VmWare image is provided for free. Users can download and 
install it in a virtual machine at their own pace with full 
documentation. Some default targets provided are: DVWA 
(Damn Vulnerable Web App), REST Demos, and JSON 
demos. They also provide WebGoat, Hackme Casino 
vulnerable application, Insecure Web App and some tools 
like burp suite.  It is a very efficient environment for practice; 
however, it seems to be a bit advanced tool for a security-
practice beginner. The environment of Web Security Dojo is 
shown in Figure 5. 
Daffodil – This is also an open source web application 
project designed for learning purpose [28]. It is similar to 
OWASP and DVWA applications. It contains both exercises 
and solutions for the selected Web application 
vulnerabilities. This tutorial also lacks proper topic 
discussions. The user has to look for other sources to find out 
more information on selected practices. It should be made 
more user-friendly so that beginners (i.e., the naive 
practitioners) can work without much hassle of finding 
information from here and there. Figure 6 shows a snapshot 
of Daffodil Lessons. 
We have discussed all these training tutorials here for 
better understanding of the topic by the readers. In fact, for 
our work, we have used all these tutorials side-by-side our 
literature survey, problem definitions, possible solutions, 
analysis, and comparisons of various approaches. 
5. Detecting SQL Injection 
In order to protect a Web application from SQL Injection 
attacks, there are two major concerns. Firstly, there is a great 
need of a mechanism to detect and exactly identify SQL 
Injection attacks. Secondly, knowledge of SQL Injection 
Vulnerabilities (SQLIVs) is a must for securing a Web 
application. So far, many frameworks have been used and/or 
suggested to detect SQLIVs in Web applications. Here, we 
mention the prominent solutions and their working methods 
in brief to let the readers know about the core ideas behind 
each work.  
5.1 SAFELI 
Fu et al., in [3] propose a Static Analysis Framework in order 
to detect SQL Injection Vulnerabilities. SAFELI framework 
aims at identifying the SQL Injection attacks during the 
compile-time. This static analysis tool has two main 
advantages. Firstly, it does a White-box Static Analysis and 
secondly, it uses a Hybrid-Constraint Solver. For the White-
box Static Analysis, the proposed approach considers the 
byte-code and deals mainly with strings. For the Hybrid-
Constraint Solver, the method implements an efficient string 
analysis tool which is able to deal with Boolean, integer and 
string variables.  
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Table 3. SQL Injection Countermeasures. 
Countermeasure Overview 
SQL-IDS [2] A specification based approach to detect malicious intrusions  
Prepared Statements [4] It is a fixed query “template” which is pre-defined, providing type–
specific placeholders for input data 
AMNESIA [6] 
This scheme identifies illegal queries before their execution. 
Dynamically-generated queries are compared with the statically-built 
model using a runtime monitoring 
SQLrand [13] A strong random integer is inserted in the SQL keywords.  
SQL DOM [14] A set of classes that are strongly-typed to a database schema are used to generate SQL statements instead of string manipulation 
SQLIA prevention using Stored 
Procedures [15], [16] Combination between static analysis and runtime monitoring 
SQLGuard [17] The parse trees of the SQL statement before and after user input are 
compared at a run time. The Web script has to be modified 
CANDID [18] Programmer-intended query structures are guessed based upon 
evaluation runs over non-attacking candidate inputs 
SQLIPA [20] Using user name and password hash values, to improve the security of the authentication process 
SQLCHECK [21] A key is inserted at both beginning and end of user’s input. Invalid 
syntactic forms are the attacks. The key strength is a major issue 
DIWeDa [22] To detect various types of intrusions in Web Databases applications 
Manual approaches [23] Defensive programming and Code review mechanisms are applied 
Automated approaches [23] Static analysis FindBugs and Web vulnerability scanning frameworks 
are implemented 
 
 
The implementation of this framework was done on 
ASP.NET Web applications and it was able to detect 
vulnerabilities that were ignored by the black-box 
vulnerability scanners. The methodology is an efficient 
approximation mechanism to deal with string constraints. 
However, the approach is only dedicated to ASP.NET 
vulnerabilities. 
 
5.2 Thomas et al.’s Scheme  
Thomas et al., in [4] suggest an automated prepared 
statement generation algorithm to remove SQL Injection 
Vulnerabilities (SQLIVs). They implement their research 
work using four open source projects namely: (i) Net-trust, 
(ii) ITrust, (iii) WebGoat, and (iv) Roller. Based on the 
experimental results, their prepared statement code was able 
to successfully replace 94% of the SQLIVs in four open 
source projects. However, the experiment was conducted 
using only Java with a limited number of projects. Hence, the 
wide application of the same approach and tool for different 
settings still remains an open research issue to investigate. 
 
5.3 Ruse et al.’s Approach 
In [5], Ruse et al. propose a technique that uses automatic 
test case generation to detect SQL Injection Vulnerabilities. 
The main idea behind this framework is based on creating a 
specific model that deals with SQL queries automatically. In 
addition, the approach identifies the relationship 
(dependency) between sub-queries. Based on the results, the 
methodology is shown to be able to specifically identify the 
causal set and obtain 85% and 69% reduction respectively 
while experimenting on few sample examples. Moreover, it 
does not produce any false positive or false negative and it is 
able to detect the real cause of the injection. In spite of the 
claimed and apparent efficiency of the technique, the major 
drawback of the work is that it was not tested with real 
queries on a real-life existing database. 
 
5.4 Haixia and Zhihong’s Database Security Testing 
Scheme 
In [7], Haixia and Zhihong propose a secure database testing 
design for Web applications. They suggest a few things; 
firstly, detection of potential input points of SQL Injection; 
secondly, generation of test cases automatically, then finally 
finding the database vulnerability by running the test cases to 
make a simulation attack to an application. The proposed 
methodology is shown to be efficient as it was able to detect 
the input points of SQL Injection exactly and on time as the 
authors expected. However, after analyzing the scheme, we 
find that the approach is not a complete solution but rather it 
needs additional improvements in two main aspects: the 
detection capability and the development of the attack rule 
library. 
 
5.5 Roichman and Gudes’s Fine-grained Access Control 
Scheme 
In [8], Roichman and Gudes, in order to secure Web 
application databases, suggest using a fine-grained access 
control to Web databases. They develop a new method based 
on fine-grained access control mechanism. The access to the 
database is supervised and monitored by the built-in database 
access control. This approach is efficient in the fact that the 
security and access control of the database is transferred from 
the application layer to the database layer.  
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Table 4. Various Schemes and SQL Injection Attacks. 
SCHEMES Tautology 
Logically 
Incorrect 
Queries 
Union 
Query 
Stored 
Procedure 
Piggy-
Backed 
Queries 
Inference Alternate Encodings 
AMNESIA 
[6] ✓ ✓ ✓ x ✓ ✓ ✓ 
SQLrand 
[13] ✓ x ✓ x ✓ ✓ x 
SQLDOM 
[14] ✓ ✓ ✓ x ✓ ✓ ✓ 
WebSSARI[1
5,16] ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
SQLGuard 
[17] ✓ ✓ ✓ x ✓ ✓ ✓ 
CANDID [18] ✓ x x x x x x 
SQLIPA[20] ✓ x x x x x x 
SQLCHECK 
[21] ✓ ✓ ✓ x ✓ ✓ ✓ 
DIWeDa[22] x x x x x ✓ x 
Automated 
approaches 
[23] 
✓ ✓ ✓ x ✓ ✓ x 
 
Table 5. Various Approaches and Types of Tasks. 
Approaches Goals Detection Prevention 
SQL-IDS [2] Yes Yes 
AMNESIA [6] Yes Yes 
SQLrand [13] Yes Yes 
SQL DOM [14] Yes Yes 
WebSSARI [15], [16] Yes Yes 
SQLGuard [17] Yes No 
CANDID [18] Yes No 
SQLIPA [20] Yes No 
SQLCHECK [21] Yes No 
DIWeDa [22] Yes No 
 
 
This is a solution of the vulnerability of the SQL session 
traceability. Besides that, it is a framework which is 
applicable to almost all database applications. Therefore, it 
significantly decreases the risk of attacks at the backend of 
the database application. 
5.6 Shin et al.’s Approach  
In [19], Shin et al. suggest SQLUnitGen, a Static-analysis-
based tool that automate testing for identifying input 
manipulation vulnerabilities. They apply SQLUnitGen tool 
which is compared with FindBugs, a static analysis tool. The 
proposed mechanism is shown to be efficient (483 attack test 
cases) as regard to the fact that false positive was completely 
absent in the experiments. However for different scenarios, 
false negatives at a small number were noticed. In addition to 
that, it was found that due to some shortcomings, a more 
significant rate of false negatives may occur “for other 
applications”. Hence, the authors talk about concentrating on 
getting rid of those significant false negatives and further 
improvement of the approach to cover input manipulation 
vulnerabilities as their future works. 
5.7 SQL-IDS Approach  
Kemalis and Tzouramanis in [2] suggest using a novel 
specification-based methodology for the detection of 
exploitations of SQL injection vulnerabilities. The proposed 
query-specific detection allowed the system to perform 
focused analysis at negligible computational overhead 
without producing false positives or false negatives. This new 
approach is very efficient in practice; however, it requires 
more experiments and comparison with available detection 
methods under a shared and flexible benchmarking 
environment. 
 
6. SQL Injection Countermeasures: Detection 
and Prevention Techniques 
In the previous section, we have discussed various schemes 
that only deal with SQL Injection detection. After having 
successfully detected any vulnerability or any kind of attack 
that exploits the vulnerability, other schemes could be 
applied to cure the system. In usual case, there are mainly 
two types of schemes; some are for prevention and others are 
for curing the system once it is under attack. In case of SQL 
Injection, those schemes which work for preventing SQL 
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Injection also do the curing of the system (or application) in 
early stage. Hence, in plain term, we could call the schemes 
‘countermeasures’.  
A strong countermeasure can remove or at least block all 
the available vulnerabilities in a system and thus it could 
protect it against various types of attacks that take advantage 
of the vulnerabilities. Once a system is under attack, the 
curing mechanisms include some other techniques like re-
setting the system, re-organizing the various elements in the 
system, etc., which are not the topics of our current study. As 
those mechanisms mainly deal with other aspects of network 
setting, database re-shuffling, re-organizing, and utilizing 
clean slate approach of re-installing the system (or, 
application), the curing schemes are irrelevant for our survey. 
After our analysis of the available steps and guidelines (after-
attack scenario), we found that they are more related to the 
managerial and administrative policies set for the system (or, 
application) once the attacks are launched against it and it 
suffers from damage. 
In this section, we list a number of countermeasures that 
could be employed before and during running the system. It 
should be noted that these schemes not only detect SQL 
Injection but also take necessary measures so that the 
vulnerabilities are not exploited by the rogue entities. So, 
these schemes defer from the schemes mentioned in the 
previous section in the point that they do more than just 
detection of SQL Injection. Here, we also present brief 
descriptions and analyze each scheme from the critical ‘need-
to-know’ angles. Table 3 shows a summary of so far known 
countermeasures against SQL Injection. 
Now, let us see what these schemes are actually about. The 
remaining texts in this section will analyze the various 
aspects covered in the different types of countermeasures. 
6.1 AMNESIA 
In [6], Junjin proposes AMNESIA approach for tracing SQL 
input flow and generating attack input, JCrasher for 
generating test cases, and SQLInjectionGen for identifying 
hotspots. The experiment was conducted on two Web 
applications running on MySQL1 1 v5.0.21. Based on three 
attempts on the two databases, SQLInjectionGen was found 
to give only two false negatives in one attempt. The proposed 
framework is efficient considering the fact that it emphasizes 
on attack input precision. Besides that, the attack input is 
properly matched with method arguments. Better than all the 
previous advantages, the proposed approach has no false 
positives and counts small number of false negatives. The 
only disadvantage of this approach is that it involves a 
number of steps using different tools. 
6.2 SQLrand Scheme 
In [13], SQLrand approach (approach using randomized SQL 
query language, targeting a particular Common Gateway 
Interface (CGI) application) is proposed by Boyd and 
Keromytis. For the implementation, they used a proof of 
concept proxy server in between the Web server (client) and 
the SQL server; they de-randomized queries received from 
the client and sent the request to the server. This de-
randomization framework has two main advantages: 
portability (applied with wide range of DBMS) and security 
(database content highly protected). The proposed scheme 
has a good performance: 6.5 milliseconds is the maximum 
latency overhead imposed on every query. Hence, it is 
efficient considering the performance obtained and defense 
against injected queries. However, this is a proof of concept; 
it still requires further testing and support from programmers 
in building tools using SQLrand targeting more DBMS back-
ends. 
6.3 SQL DOM Scheme 
SQL DOM (a set of classes that are strongly-typed to a 
database schema) framework is suggested by McClure and 
Krüger in [14]. They closely consider the existing flaws 
while accessing relational databases from the OOP (Object-
Oriented Programming) Language’s point of view. They 
mainly focus on identifying the obstacles in the interaction 
with the database via CLIs (Call Level Interfaces). SQL 
DOM object model is the proposed solution to tackle these 
issues through building a secure environment (i.e., creation of 
SQL statement through object manipulation) for 
communication. The qualitative evaluation of this approach 
has shown many advantages and benefits in terms of: error 
detection during compile time, reliability, testability, and 
maintainability. Though this mechanism is efficient, it can be 
further improved with more advanced and latest tool such as 
CodeSmith [31]. 
6.4 SQLIA Prevention Using Stored Procedures 
Stored procedures are subroutines in the database which the 
applications can make call to [15]. The prevention in these 
stored procedures is implemented by a combination of static 
analysis and runtime analysis. The static analysis used for 
commands identification is achieved through stored 
procedure parser and the runtime analysis by using a 
SQLChecker for input identification.  Huang et al. proposed 
in [16] a combination of static analysis and runtime 
monitoring to fortify the security of potential vulnerabilities. 
WebSSARI (Web application Security by Static Analysis and 
Runtime Inspection) was used and implemented on 230 open 
source applications on SourceForge.net. The approach was 
effective however it failed to remove the SQLIVs (SQL 
Injection Vulnerabilities). It was only able to list the input 
either white or black.  
6.5 Parse Tree Validation Approach  
Buehrer et al. [17] adopted the parse tree framework. They 
compared the parse tree of a particular statement at runtime 
and its original statement. They stopped the execution of 
statement unless there is a match. This method was tested on 
a student Web application using SQLGuard. Although this 
approach is efficient, it has two major drawbacks: additional 
overheard computation and listing of input only (black or 
white). 
6.6 Dynamic Candidate Evaluations Approach  
In [18], Bisht et al. propose CANDID (CANdidate evaluation 
for Discovering Intent Dynamically). It is a Dynamic 
Candidate Evaluations method for automatic prevention of 
SQL Injection attacks. This framework dynamically extracts 
the query structures from every SQL query location which 
are intended by the developer (programmer). Hence, it solves 
the issue of manually modifying the application to create the 
prepared statements. Though this tool is shown to be efficient 
for some cases, it fails in many other cases. For example, it is 
inefficient when dealing with external functions and when 
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applied at a wrong level. Besides that, sometimes it also fails 
due to the limited capability of the scheme. 
6.7 Ali et al.’s Scheme 
Ali et al. [20] adopt the hash value approach to further 
improve the user authentication mechanism. They use the 
user name and password hash values. SQLIPA (SQL 
Injection Protector for Authentication) prototype was 
developed in order to test the framework.  The username and 
password hash values are created and calculated at runtime 
for the first time the particular user account is created. Hash 
values are stored in the user account table. Though the 
proposed framework was tested on few sample data and had 
an overhead of 1.3 ms, it requires further improvement to 
reduce the overhead time. It also requires to be tested with 
larger amount of data.  
6.8 SQLCHECKER Approach 
Su and Wassermann [21] implement their algorithm with 
SQLCHECK on a real time environment. It checks whether 
the input queries conform to the expected ones defined by the 
programmer. A secret key is applied for the user input 
delimitation [1].  The analysis of SQLCHECK shows no 
false positives or false negatives. Also, the overhead runtime 
rate is very low and can be implemented directly in many 
other Web applications using different languages. It is a very 
efficient approach; however, once an attacker discovers the 
key, it becomes vulnerable. Furthermore, it also needs to be 
tested with online Web applications.  
6.9 Detecting Intrusions in Web Databases (DIWeDa) 
Approach 
Roichman and Gudes [22] propose IDS (Intrusion Detection 
Systems) for the backend databases. They use DIWeDa, a 
prototype which acts at the session level rather than the SQL 
statement or transaction stage, to detect the intrusions in Web 
applications. DIWeDa profiles the normal behavior of 
different roles in terms of the set of SQL queries issued in a 
session, and then compares a session with the profile to 
identify intrusions [22]. The proposed framework is efficient 
and could identify SQL injections and business logic 
violations too.  However, with a threshold of 0.07, the True 
Positive Rate (TPR) was found to be 92.5% and the False 
Positive Rate (FPR) was 5%. Hence, there is a great need of 
accuracy improvement (Increase of TPR and decrease of 
FPR). It also needs to be tested against new types of Web 
attacks.  
6.10 Manual Approaches 
MeiJunjin [23] highlights the use of manual approaches in 
order to prevent SQLI input manipulation flaws. In manual 
approaches, defensive programming and code review are 
applied. In defensive programming: an input filter is 
implemented to disallow users to input malicious keywords 
or characters. This is achieved by using white lists or black 
lists. As regards to the code review [24], it is a low cost 
mechanism in detecting bugs; however, it requires deep 
knowledge on SQLIAs. 
6.11 Automated Approaches  
Besides using manual approaches, MeiJunjin [23] also 
highlights the use of automated approaches. The author notes 
that the two main schemes are: Static analysis FindBugs and 
Web vulnerability scanning. Static analysis FindBugs 
approach detects bugs on SQLIAs, gives warning when an 
SQL query is made of variable. However, for the Web 
vulnerability scanning, it uses software agents to crawl, scans 
Web applications, and detects the vulnerabilities by 
observing their behavior to the attacks. 
6.12 Comparisons 
It would be difficult to give a clear verdict which scheme or 
approach is the best as each one has some proven benefits for 
specific types of settings (i.e., systems). Hence, in this 
section, we note down how various schemes work against the 
identified SQL Injection attacks. Table 4 shows a chart of the 
schemes and their defense capabilities against various 
SQLIAs. This table shows the comparative analysis of the 
SQL Injections prevention techniques and the attack types. 
Though many approaches have been identified as detection 
or prevention techniques, only few of them were 
implemented in practicality. Hence, this comparison is not 
based on empirical experience but rather it is an analytical 
evaluation.  
In Table 5, we note down the major approaches to deal 
with SQL Injection and classify them based on their features. 
 
7.   Conclusion and Future Research Directions 
Though many approaches and frameworks have been 
identified and implemented in many interactive Web 
applications, security still remains a major issue. SQL 
Injection prevails as one of the top-10 vulnerabilities and 
threat to online businesses targeting the backend databases. 
In this paper, we have reviewed the most popular existing 
SQL Injections related issues.  
Key findings of this study could be summarized as: 
- Detailed survey report on various types of SQL 
Injection attacks, vulnerabilities, detection, and 
prevention techniques 
- Assessment of techniques based on their performance 
and practicality 
- Awareness information of the threat of SQL 
Injections by providing recent and updated cases 
and information 
- Exploration of “Web Application Security training 
tutorials” to train security practitioners to deal 
with SQL Injection attacks 
The findings of this study could be used for penetration 
testing purpose in order to protect data either in academic or 
industrial fields. Our research outcomes help:  
- to measure the security level of Web Applications 
using proposed tools 
- to find/detect vulnerabilities of online applications 
- to protect applications against using proposed secure 
coding approaches 
- to train security practitioners on SQL Injection using 
the proposed tutorials 
We believe that the work would be useful both for the 
general readers of the topic as well as for the practitioners. 
As a future work, we would like to develop a countermeasure 
that can efficiently tackle the innovative SQL Injection 
attacks and fix as much vulnerability as possible. Hackers are 
in reality very innovative and as the time is passing by, new 
attacks are being launched that may need new ways of 
thinking about the solutions we currently have at our hands. 
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